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Note 
 
Native American Rape Victims: Desperately 
Seeking an Oliphant-Fix 
Marie Quasius∗ 
Leslie Ironroad lay dying in her hospital bed. She scribbled 
a statement to a police officer and identified the men who raped 
her, beat her, and locked her in the bathroom where she at-
tempted to overdose on prescription medicine to escape further 
harm.1 No charges were filed.2 Members of the Standing Rock 
Sioux Reservation indicate that the police never investigated 
the men she identified.3 The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) po-
lice officer who took her statement did not follow up on her case 
because, in his words, “[federal prosecutors] only take the ones 
with a confession.”4 Prosecutorial inaction forces the BIA police, 
who at the time of Ironroad’s death had five officers for a terri-
tory the size of Connecticut,5 to triage the many calls they re-
ceive each week.6  
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Anna Richey-Allen, and Kyle Hawkins for their encouragement and enthu-
siasm. Finally, my beloved friends, family, and boyfriend deserve thanks for 
their patience while I wrote and revised this Note. Copyright © 2009 by Marie 
Quasius. 
 1. All Things Considered: Rape Cases on Indian Land Go Uninvestigated 
(National Public Radio broadcast July 25, 2007), available at http://www.npr 
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12203114. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5.  Id. By 2008, the number had increased to ten, still far short of the lev-
el needed for minimally safe staffing. See Discussion Draft Legislation to Ad-
dress Law and Order in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on In-
dian Affairs, 110th Cong. 13 (2008) (statement of Ron His Horse Is Thunder, 
Chair of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe). Ten officers provide an actual staff-
ing level of two officers on duty per 24-hour period. Id. During the summer of 
2008, the BIA implemented Operation Dakota Peacekeeper, a temporary surge 
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Rape of Native American7 and Alaska Native women8 oc-
curs at a disproportionately high rate compared to women in 
other racial and ethnic groups in the United States.9 Not only 
are Native women more likely to be raped, they are more likely 
to have injuries, and their injuries are often more severe.10 The 
perpetrators overwhelmingly come from outside the Native 
American community11 and their crimes generally go uninves-
 
of twenty additional law-enforcement personnel to Standing Rock. Id. at 9 
(statement of Sen. Thune). Following the surge, the BIA hoped to maintain an, 
albeit still insufficient, total of seventeen officers in Standing Rock. See 
Progress and Future of Operation Dakota Peacekeeper: Field Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 26 (2008) (statement of W. Pa-
trick Ragsdale, Dir., Office of Justice Servs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior). 
 6. All Things Considered: Rape Cases on Indian Land Go Uninvesti-
gated, supra note 1. 
 7.   Consensus does not exist about terminology collectively to describe 
tribes in the United States. CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW REVELATIONS OF 
THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS 387 (Vintage Books 2006) (2005). For a 
brief overview of the origins and problems of the terms “Indian” and “Native 
American” see MANN, supra, at 387–92 (“Appendix A: Loaded Words”). Indian 
is more commonly used in federal law—e.g. Title 25 of the United States Code 
is entitled “Indians,”— while Native American appears in some scholarly 
works. This Note uses the terms and their variants interchangeably and pre-
fers Indian or American Indian when referring to federal law, and Native 
American or Native in other contexts. I do not make legal or ethnological dis-
tinctions between the two terms for the purposes of this Note. 
 8. Men and women both experience rape and sexual assault, however, 
this Note focuses on Native women because the overwhelming majority of sex-
ual assaults are committed against women. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON 
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 24 (1997). 
 9. See AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 2 (2007); Brenda 
Norrell, Native Women Are Prey: Communities and Courts Fail Native Women, 
NEWS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Dec. 29, 2003, at 9, 9 (“One in three Native 
American women will be raped in her lifetime.”).  
 10. See Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of 
Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 456–
57 (2005) (noting that 90% of Native women report that their aggressors hit 
them during the assault, compared to 74% of non-Native rape victims). Simi-
larly, 50% of Native women reported injury, compared to 30% of the general 
population. Id. at 457. Additionally, nearly three times more Native women 
than non-Native women report that their aggressor used a weapon during the 
rape. Id.  
 11. See STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS 
AND CRIME 9 (2004) (“Nearly 4 in 5 American Indian victims of rape/sexual 
assault described the offender as white.”); Deer, supra note 10, at 457 (citing 
studies reporting that white perpetrators commit 70% of rapes involving Na-
tive women); see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 5 (reporting data from 
Oklahoma and Alaska that suggest that approximately 58% of perpetrators 
are non-Indian and noting the need for further quantitative study). Compare 
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tigated and unprosecuted.12 Thus, even though Native Ameri-
can women are more likely to be sexually assaulted, their ag-
gressors are less likely to be prosecuted. Jurisdictional issues 
present the main barrier to prosecution and play a large role in 
the disparity.13 The situation may worsen: some scholars sug-
gest that the prevalence of such violent incidents may increase 
as new gambling and tourism initiatives bring non-Indians into 
closer contact with Native American women living on reserva-
tions.14  
This Note focuses on the jurisdictional difficulties that pre-
vent or limit the prosecution of sexual assault of Native women 
by non-Indian aggressors. For a variety of institutional and so-
cial reasons, the appropriate federal or state authorities15 pros-
ecute few perpetrators of rape of Native American women.16 
For example, Department of Justice records show that federal 
prosecutors filed only 606 criminal cases in 2006 for all of In-
dian country, which includes more than 560 federally recog-
nized tribes.17 Similar reports exist for tribal governments in 
Public Law 28018 states, where state prosecutors have criminal 
jurisdiction but tribes find the response similarly inadequate.19  
 
these figures to the fact that Native Americans comprise 70% of defendants 
sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines for aggravated criminal 
sexual abuse, statutory rape, and sexually abusive contact. See John V. Butch-
er, Federal Courts and the Native American Sex Offender, 13 FED. SENTENC-
ING REP. 85, 85 (2000). 
 12. All Things Considered: Rape Cases on Indian Land Go Uninvesti-
gated, supra note 1. 
 13. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 27 (describing jurisdictional 
difficulties in two reported rapes where the blindfolded victims could not iden-
tify whether or not the crime occurred on tribal land). 
 14. Cf., e.g., Jared B. Cawley, Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Go 
Back on the Rez: Is It Safe?, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 413, 429 (2004-05) (suggest-
ing a likely increase in crime rates due to an influx of non-Indians onto reser-
vations for gambling). 
 15. See Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 125–26 (2004). 
 16. See Norrell, supra note 9, at 9 (noting the total number of convictions 
for forcible rape of Native women nationwide in 2003 (54) and the number of 
rapes reported on a single South Dakota reservation in a single month (40)).  
 17. N. Bruce Duthu, Op-Ed., Broken Justice in Indian Country, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2008, at A17.  
 18. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1162 (2006), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1322 (2006), and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (2000) (popularly known as Public Law 280)).  
 19. See Deer, supra note 15, at 126; Mending the Sacred Hoop, Jurisdic-
tional Issues Complicate Response to Sexual Assault for Tribes Under PL280 
Status, THE RESOURCE (Nat’l Sexual Violence Resource Ctr., Enola Pa.), 
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While tribal courts technically may prosecute the small 
proportion of perpetrators who are Native American,20 the In-
dian Civil Rights Act21 (ICRA) limits punishment to one year of 
imprisonment, a $5,000 fine, or both22—far less than the state 
and federal penalties for the same crimes, which generally ex-
ceed eight and twelve years, respectively.23 Furthermore, even 
if a tribe asserts jurisdiction, the lack of funding for tribal law 
enforcement restricts investigation and prosecution.24 Some 
tribes even curtail law enforcement activities related to crimes 
of sexual violence because they believe that they lack the abili-
ty to arrest suspects.25  
Federal statutes and case law set out an unduly complex 
system wherein criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed 
in Indian country depends on a number of factors: the type of 
crime,26 where it occurred,27 and the tribal-membership status 
 
Fall/Winter 2003, at 2, 12 (reporting consequences of jurisdictional confusion 
in Public Law 280 states). 
 20. Deer, supra note 15, at 128 (noting that sexual-assault prosecutions in 
tribal courts occur, but are rare).  
 21. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 77 (codi-
fied as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303). 
 22. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).  
 23. Duthu, supra note 17. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MA-
NUAL § 2A3.1 & ch. 5, pt. A, at 396 (2008) (setting the base sentence range for 
aggravated sexual assault at 151–188 months). 
 24. Deer, supra note 10, at 463 (“In addition to the multitude of legal bar-
riers restricting tribal governments from taking action against sexual violence, 
tribal nations are notoriously underresourced.”). Deer further notes, “There 
are fewer law enforcement officers in Indian Country than in other rural areas 
and significantly fewer per capita than nationwide.” Id. (citation omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, in Indian country, per capita 
spending on law enforcement is approximately 60% of the national average. 
Id.  
 25. Amy Radon, Note, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The 
Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 1275, 1284 (2004). 
 26. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (current 
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (popularly known as the Major Crimes 
Act)). The Major Crimes Act distinguishes fifteen crimes as “major” and grants 
jurisdiction to the federal government over “[a]ny Indian who commits against 
the person or property of another Indian or other person.” Id. § 1153(a). 
 27. For example, Public Law 280 transferred criminal jurisdiction over 
any person who commits a crime in designated areas of Indian country to state 
governments in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wis-
consin. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162. But see id. § 1323 (allowing retrocession of juris-
diction to the federal government). Amendments to Public Law 280 also allow 
other states to assume criminal jurisdiction but require tribal consent. See id. 
§ 1321.  
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of the victim and the perpetrator.28 Often, the ensuing confu-
sion over jurisdictional issues suffices to deter investigation 
and prosecution by any authority.29 Indeed, since the Supreme 
Court decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe30 effec-
tively stripped tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
tribal law enforcement officials and victim advocates have re-
ported a substantial increase in the number of non-Indian crim-
inals who exploit this gap in jurisdiction and commit crimes on 
reservations.31 The failure to prosecute troubles Indian com-
munities,32 but they lack the political power to oust unsatisfac-
tory state or federal prosecutors.33 Ultimately, Native American 
rape victims rarely receive justice.  
This Note argues that tribes should exercise criminal ju-
risdiction over sex crimes involving Native American women 
and that if an opt-in program34 existed, tribes with the capacity 
to prosecute offenders could provide more effective and cultu-
rally relevant justice for rape survivors. Part I describes the 
development of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and the 
current legal obstacles that prevent the prosecution of Indians 
and non-Indians for sexual assault of Native American women. 
It also explores the potential of modern tribal governments to 
undertake prosecutions. Part II outlines an opt-in program to 
evaluate the ability of tribal governments to assume criminal 
 
 28. The Major Crimes Act extends federal jurisdiction only to crimes 
committed by Indians in Indian country. Id. § 1153.  
 29. Ralph Blumenthal, For Indian Victims of Sexual Assault, a Tangled 
Legal Path, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at A16.  
 30. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 31. Deer, supra note 15, at 126; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 27–28. 
 32. Avis Little Eagle, Rape Charge Dropped, Standing Rock Angry, IN-
DIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 25, 1996, at A1 (describing the Standing Rock 
Sioux community’s anger over the dismissal of a rape charge on statute-of-
limitation grounds because the district attorney had “bungled” the case of a 
Native woman who was raped, beaten, shot several times in the head and tor-
so, and then chained to the back of a pickup truck and dumped in a river). 
 33. Most nonfederal prosecutors are elected by citizens of the state and 
subject to numerous political checks. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, 
Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 728 (2006) [hereinafter Wash-
burn, American Indians]. In contrast, federal prosecutors are appointed by the 
executive branch and are not accountable to tribal members for their deci-
sions. Cf. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self–
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 846–47 (2006) [hereinafter Washburn, 
Federal Criminal Law] (noting that, in other contexts, providers of services 
who are directly accountable to a tribe provide improved delivery of services). 
 34. Generally, an opt-in program would give tribes the opportunity to un-
dertake criminal jurisdiction, but would not mandate that they do so. See infra 
Part II.C.  
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jurisdiction over sexual assault and other major crimes and 
then facilitate the assumption of jurisdiction. This approach 
considers the strengths and weaknesses of alternative solu-
tions. Finally, Part III argues that law and policy support giv-
ing tribes criminal jurisdiction as the best long-term solution 
for Native American women, tribal sovereignty, and federal 
and state governments. Ultimately, an opt-in program would 
eliminate the jurisdictional gap for some Indian tribes and in-
crease their ability to prosecute individuals who commit hein-
ous crimes against Native American women. 
I.  CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER SEXUAL ASSAULT IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY   
Depending on the circumstances, prosecutors from the 
state, federal, or tribal government might act against the per-
petrator of a sexual assault, but often none do because of the 
jurisdictional maze outlined below. This section details the cur-
rent jurisdictional confusion, which impedes the prosecution of 
sexual assaults perpetrated against Native American women, 
and considers the ability of modern tribal courts to assume 
greater jurisdiction. 
A.  THE FEDERAL (OR STATE) GOVERNMENT HAS JURISDICTION 
OVER MOST CRIMES COMMITTED BY INDIANS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Indian tribes are sovereign nations; a tribe retains its sove-
reign powers unless expressly relinquished by the tribe in a 
treaty or taken from the tribe by a federal statute.35 Under the 
terms of early treaties, tribes generally retained the right of 
self-government, including “maintaining the relations of peace 
and war, of being responsible in their political character for any 
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed 
on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their 
community.”36 By the terms of many treaties, certain tribes 
even retained the power to punish non-Indian individuals who 
intruded on Indian lands and committed a crime.37 According to 
 
 35. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes 
still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, 
or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”). But see Ex 
parte Crow Dog, 119 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (requiring a clear expression of the 
intention of Congress to abrogate tribal sovereignty).  
 36. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). 
 37. See, e.g., Treaty of Greeneville art. VI, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49, 52 (“If 
any citizen of the United States, or any other white person or persons, shall 
presume to settle upon the lands now relinquished by the United States, such 
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some scholars, tribes retained this power in almost every treaty 
the signed around the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.38 Nevertheless, Congress passed the General Crimes Act39 
and the Major Crimes Act,40 which vested jurisdiction over 
crimes committed in Indian country in the federal government 
instead of tribal governments.  
The General Crimes Act grants criminal jurisdiction to the 
federal government over crimes “by and against” Indians except 
where: (1) an Indian committed a crime against another Indian 
or on Indian land, (2) an Indian had already been punished ac-
cording to the local law of the tribe, or (3) the treaty reserved 
criminal jurisdiction to the tribe.41 The rationale for the excep-
tions was that there was no federal interest to justify an intru-
sion on tribal sovereignty.42  
In spite of this, the Major Crimes Act obliterates these ex-
ceptions by providing the federal government with jurisdiction 
over specific crimes, including sexual assault,43 committed by 
 
citizen or other person shall be out of the protection of the United States; and 
the Indian tribe, on whose land the settlement shall be made, may drive off 
the settler, or punish him in such manner as they shall think fit.”). 
 38. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 123 n.22 (2002). 
 39. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383, 383 (current version at 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)). The General Crimes Act expressly recognized existing 
treaties: “[N]othing in this act shall be so construed as to affect any treaty now 
in force between the United States and any Indian nation, or to extend to any 
offence committed by one Indian against another, within any Indian boun-
dary.” Id. § 2. 
 40. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (current version at 
18 U.S.C. § 1153). The Major Crimes Act granted full jurisdiction to the feder-
al government over all Indians, whether an alleged crime occurred in Indian 
country or not. Id.  
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The General Crimes Act provides: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of 
the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any 
place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, 
except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian 
against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished 
by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipula-
tions, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be se-
cured to the Indian tribes respectively. 
Id. 
 42. See Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 793. 
 43. The “major crimes” originally covered by the Major Crimes Act in-
cluded murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, bur-
glary, and larceny. See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. at 385. But, 
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Indians against other Indians in Indian country.44 If no federal 
law exclusively governs the offense, then the federal court de-
termines the choice of law by reference to law of the state with-
in which the offense was committed.45  
States lack jurisdiction over crimes committed by or 
against Indians in Indian country unless federal legislation ex-
pressly grants authority.46 Although the Supreme Court cha-
racterized states as the “deadliest enemies” of tribes,47 Con-
gress transferred criminal jurisdiction to several states through 
Public Law 280 in an attempt to fill a gap in jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on reservations.48 But, Congress did not soli-
cit the consent of the tribes or the states and failed to provide 
funding for the state governments to fulfill their additional re-
sponsibilities.49 Thus, although one motivation for Congress to 
enact Public Law 280 was to fix the jurisdictional gap on many 
reservations, it actually increased the gap by allocating prose-
cutorial responsibility to state governments that lacked the re-
sources to prosecute.50 Ultimately, Congress transferred crimi-
 
various amendments (including nearly an entire chapter of the federal crimi-
nal code) make it “something of a fool’s errand to attempt to count the number 
of offenses enumerated by the Major Crimes Act.” Washburn, Federal Crimi-
nal Law, supra note 33, at 826. 
 44. The Act states: “Any Indian who commits against the person or prop-
erty of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, name-
ly . . . a felony under chapter 109A . . . shall be subject to the same law and 
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Chapter 109A 
of Title 18 of the United States Code concerns sexual abuse. See id. §§ 2241–
2248.  
 45. Id. § 1153(b). 
 46. CAROLE GOLDBERG & HEATHER VALDEZ SINGLETON, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PUBLIC LAW 280 AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY—
RESEARCH PRIORITIES 1 (2005), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/209839.pdf. 
 47. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[Tribes] owe no 
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the 
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their 
deadliest enemies.”). 
 48. See S. REP. NO. 83-699, at 5 (1953) (“In many States, tribes are not 
adequately organized to perform that function [law enforcement]; consequent-
ly, there has been created a hiatus . . . that could be remedied by conferring 
criminal jurisdiction on States indicating an ability and willingness to accept 
such responsibility.”); see also Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits 
of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 540–44 
(1975) (reviewing the legislative history of Public Law 280). 
 49. Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Aris-
ing in Indian Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction Among Tribal, 
State, and Federal Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 973, 1023 (2000). 
 50. Cf. id.  
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nal jurisdiction to federal and state law enforcement without 
securing the actual provision of law enforcement and justice. 
B.  TRIBES DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES 
COMMITTED IN INDIAN COUNTRY BY NON-INDIANS  
The Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suqua-
mish Indian Tribe51 effectively precludes tribal prosecution of 
non-Indians who sexually assault Native American women.52 
The Oliphant case arose from the separate arrests of two non-
Indian men on the Port Madison Reservation.53 The Suquamish 
Tribe had prominently posted notices at entrances to the reser-
vation to alert all visitors that their entry indicated consent to 
the criminal jurisdiction of tribal court.54 Tribal police officers 
arrested Mark Oliphant and charged him with assaulting a tri-
bal police officer and resisting arrest.55 A second defendant, 
Daniel Belgarde, was arrested and charged with recklessly en-
dangering another person and injuring tribal property.56 After 
conviction in the tribal court, the two defendants sought a writ 
of habeas corpus in federal district court,57 and ultimately the 
Supreme Court,58 to determine whether the tribe appropriately 
exercised criminal jurisdiction over the non-Indian defen-
dants.59 
1.  The Oliphant Court Held That Tribes Lack Criminal 
Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Criminal Conduct Committed on 
the Reservation 
The Supreme Court held that tribes do not have inherent 
jurisdiction to try or to punish non-Indians60 for two reasons. 
First, the Court reasoned that tribal courts lack criminal juris-
 
 51. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 52. Some scholars contend that tribes retain concurrent criminal jurisdic-
tion. See Deer, supra note 15, at 127. But, the limitations that ICRA places on 
a tribe’s ability to punish offenders make it unlikely that tribes retain jurisdic-
tion over felonies. See Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 
817. 
 53. 435 U.S. at 194. 
 54. See id. at 193 n.2. 
 55. Id. at 194. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 431 U.S. 964 (1977) (mem.) 
(granting certiorari). 
 59. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. 
 60. Id. at 212. 
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diction unless “explicitly provided by treaty or statute.”61 Fur-
ther, the Court found implicit divestment of tribal criminal ju-
risdiction through an “unspoken presumption” among Con-
gress, the executive branch, and the lower federal courts that 
tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.62 Applying 
its reasoning to the Suquamish Tribe, the Court analyzed, inter 
alia, the Suquamish Tribe’s treaty and found that the treaty’s 
silence on the issue of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
supported its finding of implicit divestment.63  
Second, the Court reasoned that because criminal justice 
implicates the deprivation of life and liberty, “citizens [should] 
be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions 
on their personal liberty.”64 On the Suquamish reservation, 
non-Indians could not participate in the political process of the 
tribal government: non-Indians, for example, could not serve on 
the juries of tribal courts.65 Furthermore, tribal constitutions 
do not necessarily draw strict boundaries between separation of 
powers; tribal courts may be subordinate to the legislative or 
executive branches of tribal governments. Subordination could 
theoretically interfere with the ability of the judges to render 
impartial judgments.66 Lastly, tribal governments do not pro-
vide all of the protections of the Bill of Rights to defendants, 
and the Court could not justify subjecting U.S. citizens to a 
judicial system providing lesser protection to defendants.67  
 
 61. Id. at 191.  
 62. See id. at 203. 
 63. Id. at 214–15. 
 64. Id. at 210. The Court applied the same reasoning used to preserve tri-
bal autonomy in Crow Dog to diminish tribal autonomy in Oliphant. Compare 
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (stating that Indians should not 
be subjected to alien federal courts because such courts tried Indians “not by 
their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but 
by . . . a different race, according to the law of a social state of which they have 
an imperfect conception”), with Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211 (“These considera-
tions [those listed in Crow Dog, supra], applied here to the non-Indian rather 
than Indian offender, speak equally strongly against the validity of respon-
dents’ contention that Indian tribes . . . retain the power to try non-Indians 
according to their own customs and procedure.”). 
 65. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.  
 66. See Elizabeth Burleson, Tribal, State, and Federal Cooperation to 
Achieve Good Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 207, 215 (2007). 
 67. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. 
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2.  The Oliphant Court Relied on Inconclusive Evidence to 
Determine Tribal Jurisdiction 
The Oliphant Court relied on several documents to support 
its conclusion that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indian defendants. First, the Court noted that the tribe 
was relying on a theory of retained inherent powers rather 
than language in a treaty or congressional grants of authori-
ty.68 After quickly dismissing the possibility of historical sup-
port for jurisdiction,69 the Court quoted the 1830 treaty with 
the Choctaw Indian Tribe, which guaranteed “the jurisdiction 
and government of all the persons and property that may be 
within their limits”70 The Court noted that a later provision in 
the treaty stated that the Choctaws “express a wish that Con-
gress may grant to the Choctaws the right of punishing by their 
own laws any white man who shall come into their nation, and 
infringe any of their national regulations.”71 The Court held 
that the provision constituted a request for affirmative con-
gressional authority, which it found inconsistent with the no-
tion that the inherent sovereignty of tribes justifies the exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.72 The Court found 
further support in two Attorneys General opinions from the 
mid-1800s that concluded that “the Choctaws did not have 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent congressional au-
thority.”73  
The Court next analyzed Ex parte Kenyon,74 an 1878 dis-
trict-court opinion from Arkansas in which the court granted a 
non-Indian defendant’s writ of habeas corpus, and held that the 
Cherokee tribal court lacked jurisdiction.75 Although the Ke-
nyon court noted in dictum that to give an Indian tribal court 
“jurisdiction of the person of an offender, such offender must be 
 
 68. Id. at 195–96. 
 69. The Court quoted an 1834 report by the Commissioners of Indian Af-
fairs to the Secretary of War which stated, “the Indian tribes are without 
laws,” see id. at 197 (quoting H.R. REP. 23-474 at 90 (1834)), as evidence that 
tribes historically lacked the ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
See id. The Court then used the Choctaw tribe as an example one of the tribes 
that had what the Court described as a “sophisticated legal structure” in the 
1830s. Id. 
 70. Id. at 197 (quoting the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, art. IV, Sept. 
27, 1830, 4 Stat. 333, 333). 
 71. Id. (quoting art. IV, 4 Stat. at 334) (second emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 197–98. 
 73. Id. at 199 (citations omitted). 
 74. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720). 
 75. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200. 
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an Indian,” it ultimately held that the Cherokee court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because the defendant left the res-
ervation and established a new domicile in Kansas.76 Further-
more, the Kenyon court stated that it respected tribal sove-
reignty and recognized the need to uphold such jurisdiction, 
“because peace and good order demand that the courts of that 
country, as well as this court, should possess the full measure 
of their jurisdiction”77—so long as tribes exercise such jurisdic-
tion constitutionally.78 The Oliphant Court relied on the Ke-
nyon holding and a 1970 Department of the Interior opinion af-
firming Kenyon, observing only in a footnote that the 
Department of the Interior opinion was inexplicably withdrawn 
in 1974 and had not been replaced.79 
Next, the Court examined the Trade and Intercourse Act of 
1790,80 in which Congress granted federal jurisdiction over of-
fenses by non-Indians against Indians which “would be punish-
able by the laws of [the] state or district . . . if the offense had 
been committed against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof.”81 
Although the Court noted that the original purpose of the Gen-
eral Crimes Act was to protect Indians from “the violences [sic] 
of the lawless part of our frontier inhabitants,” it ultimately 
found that Congress did not consider the problem of tribal ju-
risdiction over non-Indians at the time because most tribes 
lacked formal tribal judicial systems.82  
In contrast, the Court found that Congress did address the 
issue in 1834 when it tried to create an Indian territory to be 
governed by a confederation of Indian tribes, which it ultimate-
ly expected to become a state.83 Although the bill failed to pass 
 
 76. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. at 355 (“When the members of a tribe of 
Indians scatter themselves among the citizens of the United States, and live 
among the people of the United States, they are merged in the mass of our 
people, owing complete allegiance to the government of the United States and 
of the state where they may reside, and, equally with the citizens of the Unit-
ed States and of the several states, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts the-
reof.”). 
 77. Id. at 354. 
 78. A court must have “jurisdiction over the person, the act, and the place 
where it was committed” in order to exert jurisdiction over a criminal act with-
in the limits of the Constitution. Id. 
 79. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201 n.11. 
 80. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137. 
 81. Id. at 201 (quoting Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 5, 1 Stat. at 138) (al-
teration in original). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 201–02. 
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(despite multiple proposals),84 the Oliphant Court found that 
“Congress was careful not to give the tribes of the territory 
criminal jurisdiction over United States officials and citizens 
traveling through the area.”85 Still, a House of Representatives 
report that accompanied the bill described federal criminal ju-
risdiction as necessary “for some time” to protect residents both 
on and off the reservation in the absence of “competent tribun-
als of justice.”86  
The Court also looked to amendments of the General 
Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act to support the “unspoken 
assumption” that the federal government retained some crimi-
nal jurisdiction over Indians.87 Congress amended the General 
Crimes Act in 1854 to prohibit the federal courts from prosecut-
ing an Indian who had already been tried in tribal court,88 and 
created the Major Crimes Act in order to place Indian defen-
dants who committed certain “major” crimes under federal ju-
risdiction.89 After examining the General Crimes Act, the Court 
inferred that if tribal courts had jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
there would have been a parallel provision prohibiting the re-
trial of non-Indians as well.90 With regard to the Major Crimes 
Act, the Court argued that acknowledging tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians could create an anomalous situation where 
tribal courts, if they did indeed possess concurrent jurisdiction 
over major crimes, could prosecute non-Indians for major 
crimes that the tribe could not prosecute if committed by a 
member of the tribe.91 
The Oliphant Court quoted a 1960 Senate report recom-
mending the passage of a proposed statute that prohibited 
trespass onto Indian land for the purpose of hunting and fish-
 
 84. Id. at 202 n.13. 
 85. Id. at 202. The Court observed that the exception for “non-Indians 
who settled without Government business in Indian territory” probably had 
the purpose of discouraging settlement on land reserved exclusively for tribes. 
Id. at 202 n.13. 
 86. H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 18 (1834). 
 87. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203. 
 88. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270 (current version at 
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)).  
 89. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 342, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (current version at 
18 U.S.C. § 1153). 
 90. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203. 
 91. Id. The Court reserved the question of whether the Major Crimes Act 
created exclusive federal jurisdiction, id. at 203 n.14, but nonetheless assumed 
in its analysis that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 
203. 
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ing.92 The Court focused on the committee members’ state-
ments—that tribes can enforce tribal law “against Indians only; 
not against non-Indians” and that “non-Indians are not subject 
to the jurisdiction of Indian courts”93—to confirm its assump-
tion that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over non-Indians. The 
Court ignored the report’s express purpose to advocate for 
equal protection of Indian property interests as a counterpart 
to existing federal trespass laws.94  
In sum, although the Court recognized that its evidence of 
a historical shared presumption among Congress, the executive 
branch and the lower courts was “not conclusive,”95 it neverthe-
less found that tribal courts as a whole do not have the power 
to try non-Indians.96 On the basis of dictum in one district court 
case, two Attorneys General opinions from the mid-nineteenth 
century, a 1960 statement by a Senate committee, and a 1970 
Interior Solicitor’s opinion that was subsequently revoked, the 
Supreme Court nearly eliminated the power of tribal govern-
ments to obtain justice for Native American rape victims. 
C.  TRIBES DO HAVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES 
COMMITTED BY NONMEMBER INDIANS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
In Duro v. Reina,97 the Court considered whether a tribe 
could prosecute a nonmember Indian defendant.98 Albert Duro 
was a member of the Torrez-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission 
Indians living on the Salt River Indian Reservation, where he 
killed a fourteen-year-old boy from the Gila River Indian Res-
ervation.99  
After concluding that neither historical evidence nor 
precedent provided a clear-cut answer, the Court analyzed Du-
ro’s case according to the Oliphant theory of implied divest-
 
 92. Id. at 204–06 (quoting S. REP. NO. 86-1686, at 2–3 (1960)). 
 93. Id. at 205 (citing S. REP. NO. 86-1686, at 2). 
 94. See S. REP. NO. 86-1686, at 2–3.  
 95. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206. 
 96. Id. at 212. 
 97. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006)). 
Congress amended Public Law 101-511 to make the reinstatement of tribal 
authority over all Indians permanent in 1991. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-137, 105 Stat. 646.  
 98. Generally, tribes determine membership requirements. L. Scott 
Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sove-
reignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 60 n.23 (1994). 
 99. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679. 
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ment,100 opining that tribes surrendered sovereignty and juris-
diction over nonmember Indians as well when they entered into 
a relationship with the United States for protection.101 The 
Court also relied on the reasoning in Oliphant when it com-
pared the political status of nonmember and non-Indians with 
respect to the tribal government.102 Similar to non-Indians, 
nonmember Indians cannot participate in the political 
processes of the tribe—they cannot become members,103 vote, 
hold office or serve on the juries of some tribal courts.104 Thus, 
the Court concluded that tribal governments lack criminal ju-
risdiction over nonmember Indians.105  
While the Court held that tribal governments do not have 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians,106 the ultimate effect, as 
quickly recognized by Congress, was that no government had 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who committed crimes on 
another reservation.107 Thus, Congress responded with the 
“Duro-fix,”108 which amended ICRA to acknowledge expressly 
 
 100. The implied divestment argument in Oliphant rests on an “unspoken 
assumption” among Congress, the executive branch, and the lower federal 
courts that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because it had 
been withdrawn by implication as a necessary result of tribes’ dependent sta-
tus. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203. 
 101. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191); see also Unit-
ed States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 326 (1978) (discussing the Court’s im-
plied divestment reasoning). 
 102. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 688. 
 103. Duro was not eligible for membership in the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community. Id. at 679. 
 104. Id. at 688. 
 105. Id. at 679. 
 106. Id. at 696 (“[N]onmembers, who share relevant jurisdictional charac-
teristics of non-Indians, should share the same jurisdictional status.”).  
 107. See Gould, supra note 98, at 71 n.84. Currently, federal statutes gen-
erally limit jurisdiction over misdemeanors among Indians to tribes; the fed-
eral government generally has jurisdiction over felonies committed among In-
dians. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (granting jurisdiction over specific crimes 
committed in Indian country to the federal government); Sarah Krakoff, A 
Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent 
Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1186–87 (2004) (explaining the allocation of ju-
risdiction among the Navajo Nation and state and federal governments over 
various crimes). Further, it would not be feasible for the more than 300 tribes 
recognized by the federal government to enter into reciprocal jurisdictional 
agreements to prosecute nonmember Indians. Gould, supra note 98, at 77. 
 108. See Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006)). The Supreme Court affirmed the consti-
tutionality of the Duro-fix in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), hold-
ing that Congress had reinvested tribal courts with criminal jurisdiction over 
all members of federally recognized tribes. Id. at 207. 
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that tribes have inherent authority over “all Indians,”109 even 
though a federal appeals court acknowledged that “[t]he exer-
cise of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is 
virtually without historical precedent.”110 
D.  MODERN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS CAN AND DO EXERCISE 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
Although tribes have retained and regained authority in 
many contexts,111 tribal court jurisdiction over criminal conduct 
committed on the reservation remains extremely circum-
scribed, as described above.112 This section will describe the ju-
risdiction exercised by tribal courts, both historically and in 
modern times, with a focus on criminal jurisdiction.  
Historically, a substantial majority of cases in tribal courts 
involved criminal matters,113 and at the time of Oliphant, many 
tribes exercised criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.114 Sev-
eral government initiatives helped foster the ability of tribes to 
exercise such jurisdiction. The Indian Reorganization Act115 
(IRA), enacted by Congress in 1934, acknowledged that tribal 
courts could apply tribal law (within the limits of the uniform 
Bureau of Indian Affairs constitution).116 Further, the Tribal 
Self-Governance Program helps tribes assume a variety of re-
sponsibilities, including law enforcement, by providing com-
pacts and single- and multi-year funding agreements.117 With 
 
 109. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (emphasis added).  
 110. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded by 851 
F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).  
 111. See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 687 (noting that tribal courts resolve civil 
disputes involving nonmembers, even non-Indians). 
 112.  See supra Part I.A–B. 
 113. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tri-
bal Courts, 33 TULSA L. REV. 1, 4 (1997). 
 114. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978) 
(noting that of 127 reservation court systems that claim criminal jurisdiction, 
45 extend or permit extension of their jurisdiction to non-Indians). 
 115. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006). 
 116. See William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on 
the Path to Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tri-
bal Peacemaking in Indian Dispute Resolution, 76 N.D. L. REV. 551, 572–73 
(2000) (discussing the “impos[ition]” of an “Anglo-European adversarial sys-
tem” through the IRA). 
 117. See OFFICE OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE, 2007 TRIBAL LISTINGS BY 
AREA 3–5 (2007), http://www.ihs.gov/NonMedicalPrograms/SelfGovernance/ 
documents/07%20Tribal%20Listing.pdf (providing a list of tribes participating 
in the tribal self-governance program and information on the specific compacts 
and funding agreements).  
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regard to sexual violence, many tribes have sophisticated crim-
inal codes and resources available to help victims cope with 
abuse.118 Given the foundation of the court system established 
by the IRA and recent funding efforts directed at strengthening 
tribal sovereignty,119 at least some tribal legal systems would 
be ready to assume more extensive criminal jurisdiction if giv-
en the opportunity. 
Tribal governments vary widely in how they structure 
their judicial systems and how they adjudicate conflicts.120 For 
example, some tribes have oral laws,121 while others have writ-
ten laws,122 and tribes differ in the extent to which they are 
subject to direct federal authority.123 For some traditional gov-
ernments, the method of governance has not changed since the 
colonization of the American continent, and the governmental 
structure and procedure are unwritten and passed down oral-
ly.124 Other tribal governments have made a deliberate effort to 
transform their government (without any input from the feder-
al government) and have a written form of government without 
being subject to the federal government’s approval in the exer-
cise of their powers.125 Other governments were established 
pursuant to laws such as the IRA.126 Under this Act, actions of 
the tribal government are subject to the federal government’s 
direct authority, and the enforcement of any laws passed by the 
tribal council are subject to the approval of the United 
States.127 In spite of the IRA, not all tribal governments have 
 
 118. See Radon, supra note 25, at 1276, 1303–04. 
 119. See generally Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance 
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 3651–3681) (providing financial support and resources for tribal justice sys-
tems). Congress promised to provide $50 million per year for fiscal years 2000 
to 2007 for tribal court systems under the Act). Tribal justice systems have not 
received full funding. Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in In-
dian Country, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 11, 
14 (2008) (statement of Hon. Roman J. Duran, First Vice-President, Nat’l 
American Indian Court Judges Assn.). 
 120. See generally Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty 
Through Government Reform: What Are the Issues?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
72 (1997) (analyzing the current state of tribal governance and providing sug-
gestions for its reform). 
 121. Id. at 74–75. 
 122. Id. at 75. 
 123. See id. at 74–76. 
 124. See id. at 74–75. 
 125. See id. at 75. 
 126. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006). 
 127. Porter, supra note 120, at 76. 
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followed these paths. For example, the Navajo Nation has no 
constitution but works within a well-developed legal tradition 
of written government.128  
Anglo-American courts differ from tribal courts in that the 
Anglo-American system focuses on individual rights in an ad-
versarial system and resolves criminal disputes through pu-
nishment and removal of the offender from the community.129 
In contrast, many traditional Native American legal systems 
emphasize restoration of the offender and his or her reintegra-
tion into the community130 through non-adversarial strategies 
known as tribal peacemaking (TPM).131 The strategy operates 
through the use of behavior-altering mechanisms such as an-
ger, shame, embarrassment, and encouragement132 in the con-
text of an oral ceremony where the victim, the accused, and 
family members sit in a circle.133 Although some tribes have 
been extremely successful at reducing crime rates through 
TPM,134 tribes generally do not use TPM in adjudications in-
volving non-Indian or nonmember defendants,135 and commen-
tators question the effectiveness of TPM in the context of do-
mestic violence.136 
Tribal judicial systems, however, increasingly incorporate 
aspects of the Anglo-American system.137 For example, many 
tribes now provide independent judicial review, appellate re-
view, and ethical guidelines for practitioners.138 Further, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure influence some tribal judges in 
 
 128. Id.  
 129. Bradford, supra note 116, at 566. 
 130. Id. at 565. 
 131. See id. at 577–79. 
 132. Id. at 580. 
 133. Id. at 581. 
 134. For example, the Tlingit found that five years after implementing 
TPM, crime decreased by 35%. Id. at 590. However, certain offenders chal-
lenge the use of TPM in the modern world. See id. at 589–99 (recounting a 
well-publicized case where the offenders flouted the TPM agreements). 
 135. Id. at 579–80. 
 136. See, e.g., Rashmi Goel, No Woman at the Center: The Use of the Cana-
dian Sentencing Circle in Domestic Violence Cases, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 293, 
321–28 (2000) (discussing the use and feasibility of TPM in the context of do-
mestic violence and female victims).  
 137. O’Connor, supra note 113, at 5. 
 138. See id. 
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the courtroom.139 Even where tribal judges sometimes follow 
alternative procedures to adapt to local needs, they have found 
that outside legal counsel have no difficulties in submitting to 
different procedural rules.140 Some tribes, such as the Navajo, 
apply substantive laws in the courtroom as well—with the ex-
press caveat that tribal laws do not apply where they violate 
United States laws.141 Further, tribal courts often use processes 
similar to those used by state and federal courts in developing 
tribal common law.142 Although ICRA diverges from the Bill of 
Rights in the extent to which it protects individual defendants, 
some argue that tribes did not need ICRA because tribal legal 
systems already had traditions of fairness and justice equiva-
lent to those it imposed.143  
E.  TRIBES EXERCISE EXPANDED CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER 
CERTAIN SUBJECT MATTER 
Since 1970, federal Indian policy has focused on self-
determination and renewing tribal self-governance in a variety 
of contexts. Self-determination policy recognizes the inherent 
sovereignty of tribes144 and promises tribes that the federal 
government will work with tribes on a government-to-
government basis.145 This section will briefly describe two pro-
grams—one under the Clean Water Act146 and one under the 
 
 139. See Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: 
The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 
325 (1998).  
 140. Id. 
 141. For example, a provision of the Navajo Nation Code directs tribal 
courts to apply “any laws of the United States that may be applicable and any 
laws or customs of the Navajo Nation not prohibited by applicable federal 
laws.” NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 204(a) (1995). 
 142. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 139, at 328 (noting that most 
tribal courts have some, but not all, of the features necessary for the Anglo-
American common-law process). 
 143. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 116, at 574 (explaining that tribes al-
ready operated under “[a]ncient and sacred tribal traditions of fairness and 
justice”).  
 144. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n 
(2006)) (authorizing the federal government to provide funding to recognized 
tribes for the purposes of furthering the welfare of the tribes while maintain-
ing their sovereignty). 
 145. See Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tri-
bal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994) (instructing federal 
agencies to work with tribes on a “government-to-government” basis). 
 146. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1377 (2000). 
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Indian Child Welfare Act147 (ICWA)—where the federal gov-
ernment has transferred jurisdiction over a particular subject 
matter to tribal governments. The structure of these two initia-
tives will provide background for the proposal of an opt-in pro-
gram of tribal criminal jurisdiction described in Part II. 
Both ICWA and the Clean Water Act enable tribes to as-
sume additional responsibility in a specific subject area. Con-
gress enacted ICWA to counteract the disproportionate removal 
and inhumane treatment of Native American children by state 
and local agencies, and its provisions strongly favor tribal self-
determination with regard to custody of Native American child-
ren.148 For example, the Act permits tribes to petition for “re-
assumption of jurisdiction” over child custody cases being heard 
in state courts.149 Similar to the criminal justice system, the 
American system of adoption disproportionately affects the Na-
tive American community and differs from the way the com-
munity would have dealt with adoptions before interference by 
courts.150 
Likewise, the Clean Water Act (and other environmental 
statutes) provides for the “Treatment as State” (TAS) program, 
under which tribes can promulgate and enforce water quality 
standards that are stricter than federal standards, so long as 
they follow a certain process and receive EPA approval.151 In-
itially passed to fill in the regulatory gaps of federal environ-
mental law, the TAS program relied on established tribal gov-
ernments, fixed territories, and longstanding commitments to 
protection of the environment.152 Indeed, lawsuits filed against 
tribes demonstrate real differences between tribes and states in 
 
 147. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006). 
 148. See Catherine M. Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska: 
Fifteen Years, a Foundation for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 662–63 
(1994) (noting the significance of the Act for its “implicit repudiation of the 
guardian-ward relationship that the United States had compelled upon native 
tribal peoples”). 
 149. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (“Any Indian tribe which became subject to State ju-
risdiction . . . may reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.”). 
 150. Brooks, supra note 148, at 665 (“In devising a system of child place-
ment and adoption designed to distance the child from his or her biological 
family, American jurisprudence has created a system of child-rearing that is 
foreign to the American Indian population, upon which the process is used 
disproportionately frequently.”). 
 151. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). 
 152. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State: The 
Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 818 (2004). 
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the enforcement of federal environmental laws in terms of 
perspective, commitment, and legal posture.153  
Regulations promulgated under ICWA describe the process 
that tribes must go through to reassume exclusive jurisdiction 
for a particular subject area.154 The application requires the 
tribe, inter alia, to describe its tribal court system, provide cop-
ies of tribal rules and procedures for the exercise of jurisdiction 
over the subject area, and cite provisions of the tribal constitu-
tion that allow tribal jurisdiction over the subject matter.155 
The Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs reviews each applica-
tion and approves it if it meets certain requirements.156 The pe-
tition must show that the tribal constitution authorizes such 
jurisdiction and that the tribe has a procedure for clearly iden-
tifying persons who will be subject to the tribe’s jurisdiction.157 
The Assistant Secretary must also determine that a tribe ap-
pears able to exercise jurisdiction over Indian child custody 
matters in a manner consistent with due process and the other 
safeguards embodied in ICRA and that the tribe has shown 
that sufficient child care services are available for children who 
are removed from their homes.158 The Assistant Secretary pub-
lishes a notice of approved petitions in the Federal Register 
that clearly defines the territory subject to the re-assumption of 
jurisdiction, and sends a copy to the tribe and the attorney gen-
eral, governor and highest court of the state(s) affected by the 
change in jurisdiction.159 If the Assistant Secretary does not 
approve the petition, then the Bureau of Indian Affairs must 
notify the tribe of its reasons for not approving the petition, of-
fer technical assistance to remedy the defects and allow the 
tribe to re-petition after correcting the defects in the original 
plan.160  
 
 153. See id. at 820–23 (discussing three lawsuits filed against tribes for al-
leged violations of the Clean Water Act and the interests of states and tribes 
in these cases).  
 154. See Allison M. Dussias, Note, Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Civil 
Disputes Involving Non-Indians: An Assessment of National Farmers Union 
Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribes of Indians and a Proposal for Reform, 20 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 239–40 (1986) (describing the process for reassump-
tion of jurisdiction); see also Tribal Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Child 
Custody Proceedings, 25 C.F.R. § 13 (2008). 
 155. 25 C.F.R. § 13.11(a). 
 156. Id. § 13.12(a). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. § 13.14(a)–(b). 
 160. Id. § 13.14(c)–(d). 
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Similarly, the Clean Water Act allows tribes to apply to the 
Environmental Protection Agency for TAS status.161 As a thre-
shold matter, the tribe must prove that it constitutes a govern-
ing body that carries out “substantial governmental duties and 
powers.”162 Second, the tribe must show that the functions that 
it seeks to regulate pertain to the management and protection 
of water resources.163 Last, the tribe must be “reasonably capa-
ble,” in the Administrator’s judgment, of carrying out the func-
tions in a manner consistent with the statute and all relevant 
regulations.164 Once a tribe receives TAS status, then it follows 
the same regulations as a state in promulgating its stan-
dards.165 In what may be the only challenge to a particular 
standard, the Tenth Circuit in City of Albuquerque v. Brown-
er166 affirmed the Isleta Pueblo Indians’ enforcement of a more 
stringent tribal water-quality standard on the effluent of an 
upstream wastewater plant and accepted the argument that 
the tribe’s ceremonial use of the river supported the need for a 
more stringent water-quality standard.167 Tribes, once given ju-
risdiction under the Clean Water Act, have promulgated and 
enforced standards relevant to the special needs of their mem-
bers. Part II of this Note will propose an opt-in program that 
would allow tribes to implement more stringent sexual-assault 
laws and impose greater penalties. 
F.  THE JURISDICTIONAL MAZE IMPEDES EFFECTIVE 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION. 
Despite the success of tribal governments with assuming 
jurisdiction over water quality and adoption, the jurisdictional 
maze prevents successful prosecution. The effect of Oliphant 
and its progeny is two-fold. First, tribes cannot prosecute non-
Indians who rape Native American women in Indian country. 
Thus, if a non-Indian sexually assaults a Native American per-
son, then federal courts (or state courts, in Public Law 280 
states)168 have exclusive jurisdiction.169 If a non-Indian rapes a 
 
 161. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2008) (“Re-
quirements for Indian Tribes to administer a water quality standards pro-
gram.”).  
 162. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1). 
 163. Id. § 1377(e)(2). 
 164. Id. § 1377(e)(3). 
 165. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(c). 
 166. 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 167. Id. at 428–29. 
 168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (granting several states criminal jurisdic-
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non-Indian in Indian country, then the court of the state in 
which the reservation is located has jurisdiction over the crime, 
even though it occurred on Indian land.170 Given that a signifi-
cant number of offenders are non-Indians,171 tribes must rely 
on federal and state prosecutors to obtain justice for most 
rapes.  
Tribes, in contrast, can prosecute only Native Americans 
who commit crimes that do not constitute major crimes as de-
fined by the Major Crimes Act,172 and can punish the perpetra-
tors only to the extent permitted by ICRA.173 Therefore, if an 
Indian sexually assaults another Indian, then federal courts 
have jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act,174 and tribal 
courts may have concurrent—but extremely limited—
jurisdiction to impose lesser penalties.175 Although many tribes 
with large numbers of nonmember Indians have found limited 
misdemeanor jurisdiction to be essential to self-governance,176 
tribal penalties cannot successfully deter sexual assault when 
the federal government fails to prosecute felony assaults.  
II.  AN “OPT-IN” PROGRAM FOR TRIBES TO ASSUME 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE 
SOLUTION   
Tribal jurisdiction represents the most effective and the 
most appropriate option for prosecution of sexual assaults. An 
opt-in program would provide a gradual transition to full tribal 
 
tion over certain Indian countries located within their state to the same extent 
as permitted, under state law, for non-Indian country territory). 
 169. Id.; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 
145–58 (Stephen L. Pevar ed., 2002). 
 170. See Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896) (holding that 
state courts may have jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians 
against non-Indians in Indian country); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 
621, 624 (1882) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted by a non-Indian against another non-Indian within a reservation).  
 171. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 5. 
 172. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (transferring jurisdiction over certain crimes to fed-
eral authorities). 
 173. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006) (limiting tribal governments to impos-
ing a punishment of imprisonment longer than one year and/or a fine greater 
than $5,000). 
 174. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (granting jurisdiction to the federal govern-
ment over sexual-abuse crimes). 
 175. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 169, at 148–49. 
 176. See Gould, supra note 98, at 72 n.84 (discussing the presence of a ju-
risdictional “void” if tribes are not allowed to prosecute misdemeanors); cf. 18 
U.S.C. § 1302(7). 
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jurisdiction over sexual assault and other criminal matters and 
would assuage any concerns that non-Indian defendants will 
not receive due process. As described above, existing programs 
under ICWA and the Clean Water Act provide a model for a 
program to allow some tribes to undertake criminal jurisdic-
tion. Ultimately, as Part III asserts, both law and policy sup-
port the implementation of an opt-in program as highly benefi-
cial to victims. 
A.  CONGRESS’S ROLE IN CREATING AN OPT-IN PROGRAM 
This Note proposes the creation of an opt-in program that 
allows tribes to assume criminal jurisdiction over acts commit-
ted on the reservation. Accomplishing this goal requires a 
number of steps. First, ICRA must be amended, as it was for 
the Duro-fix,177 to include “all persons.”178 This would enable 
tribes to extend their criminal jurisdiction to include non-
Indians. Second, Congress must amend the Major Crimes Act 
so that it explicitly allows concurrent tribal jurisdiction over 
sexual assault. Thus, tribes that gain entry into the opt-in pro-
gram would have the freedom to prosecute, but Native Ameri-
can women from nonparticipating tribes would still receive the 
protection of the federal government. Third, Congress would 
have to amend ICRA to allow approved tribal governments to 
impose punishments appropriate to the crime being prosecuted. 
In addition, Congress must provide resources for the BIA to 
administer the opt-in program. This would cover the payment 
of public defenders in tribal courts and funding for the BIA to 
help qualified tribes assume criminal jurisdiction and make ar-
rangements for long-term incarceration. Finally, Congress 
would need to provide for appellate review, whether in the fed-
eral courts or in a specialized appellate court.  
Congress has the authority to reinvest tribal sovereignty 
by amending these statutes to allow tribes to opt-in to criminal 
 
 177. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (extending jurisdiction to include nonmember 
Indians). 
 178. The Duro-fix, where Congress extended tribal criminal jurisdiction to 
nonmember Indians, required nothing more than a simple amendment to 
ICRA that changed the words “all members” to “all Indians.” See Act of Nov. 
5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (amending 
25 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1988) by reinstating until September 30, 1991 tribal crim-
inal jurisdiction to “all Indians”). Congress made the change permanent the 
next year in the Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (codi-
fied as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301) (deleting the sunset provision).  
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jurisdiction.179 In a challenge to the Duro-fix, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the inherent, not delegated, authority of tribes 
to prosecute and punish nonmember Indians.180 While beyond 
the scope of this Note, this distinction is important for under-
standing the source of governmental power.181 Briefly, when 
tribal authority is delegated, the source of the power is Con-
gress, and the tribe merely exercises the narrow powers 
granted by Congress.182 But when tribal authority is inherent, 
the source of the power is the tribe and the tribe is not limited 
to the fulfillment of a narrow congressional directive.183  
Duro and Oliphant held that tribes do not have criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and non-Indians, respec-
tively. The Court relied on similar reasoning in both cases—
that prosecution by tribal governments disadvantages non-
member Indians and non-Indian defendants.184 Yet, with re-
spect to tribal governments, nonmember Indians and non-
Indians do not differ other than by race.185 Congress chose to 
reinvest inherent tribal sovereignty with respect to nonmemb-
ers,186 and has the authority to implement an “Oliphant-fix.”187 
 
 179. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 207 (2004). For a discussion of 
using an opt-in provision for domestic violence, see Rebecca A. Hart & M. Al-
exander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect Na-
tive American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 185, 227–28 
(2008). 
 180. Lara, 541 U.S. at 206. 
 181. See Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword: Tribal Civil 
Regulatory Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act After United States v. La-
ra, 35 ENVTL. L. 471, 473 (2005) (discussing the difference between delegated 
and inherent power and the sources of such power). 
 182. See id.  
 183. See id.  
 184. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978). 
 185. Cf. G.D. Crawford, Looking Again at Tribal Jurisdiction: “Unwar-
ranted Intrusions on Their Personal Liberty,” 76 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 430 (1993) 
(explaining that the inclusion of nonmember Indians and the exclusion of non-
Indians from “tribal jurisdiction [is] impermissibly based on race”). But see 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding that the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs hiring preference for “Indians” was not a racial classification, but rather 
a political class related to membership in a federally recognized tribe). 
 186. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (extending criminal jurisdiction of tri-
bes to include “all Indians”). 
 187.  Cf. N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 207–16 (2008) 
(describing and critiquing draft legislation which would, inter alia, restore in-
herent tribal sovereignty and effectively overrule Oliphant and other recent 
Supreme Court decisions limiting tribal sovereignty). 
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Congress must consider certain factors in order to reinvest 
inherent sovereignty with regard to criminal jurisdiction. First, 
Oliphant prohibits tribes from exercising jurisdiction over non-
Indians because of due process considerations.188 The U.S. Con-
stitution requires that tribal courts extend all of the Bill of 
Rights protections to non-Indian defendants189 because regard-
less of race or tribal affiliation, any defendant is a U.S. citizen, 
and thus entitled to constitutional protection.190 Then again, 
ICRA already imposes nearly all of those requirements on tri-
bal courts,191 and with additional funding, it would be easy for 
tribal courts to meet the single remaining requirement that de-
fendants in a criminal trial have the opportunity to have legal 
counsel provided by the court.192 The government agency admi-
nistering the program would require tribes to provide full Bill 
of Rights protections to criminal defendants. Congress has al-
ready shown that it recognizes the problems with criminal jus-
tice in Indian country and acknowledges the need to commit 
funds,193 and could easily direct funding toward the provision of 
such legal counsel. Second, ICRA limits the punishment that 
 
 188. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194 (“[D]efendants [in tribal courts] are en-
titled to many of the due process protections accorded to defendants in federal 
or state criminal proceedings. However, the guarantees are not identical.”). 
 189. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (expressing concern that Congress can subject Lara, a U.S. citizen, “to 
a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution”). 
 190. If the source of power for tribal courts is Congress, then the Constitu-
tion would bind any court exercising jurisdiction over defendants who are U.S. 
citizens. Id. Whether the authority is a grant from Congress, a relaxation of 
restrictions, or retained as a part of original tribal sovereignty exceeds the 
scope of this Note. 
 191. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (discussing the rights which cannot be infringed 
by tribal governments); Larry Cunningham, Note, Deputization of Indian 
Prosecutors: Protecting Indian Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 2187, 
2199 (2000) (“The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 . . . guarantees basic due 
process protections to Indians tried in tribal courts; the same protections could 
easily be extended to non-Indians.”).  
 192. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (holding 
that under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right to an attorney, 
and if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them), with 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(6) (providing that defendants have the right to an attorney, but 
this attorney must be provided at their “own expense”).  
 193. See Office of Violence Against Women, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, STOP Vi-
olence Against Women Formula Grant Program, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/ 
stop_grant_desc.htm [hereinafter STOP Violence] (last visited Apr. 12, 2009) 
(“STOP formula grants and subgrants are intended for [among other purposes] 
. . . [d]eveloping, enlarging, or strengthening programs addressing the needs 
and circumstances of Indian tribes in dealing with violent crimes against 
women, including the crimes of sexual assault and domestic violence.”).  
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can be imposed by a tribal court,194 and Congress should amend 
ICRA to allow tribes to dictate punishments that are commen-
surate with the seriousness of the crime.  
B.  THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS’ ROLE IN CREATING AN OPT-
IN PROGRAM 
The BIA’s unique experience assessing the capacity of tri-
bal legal systems under ICWA makes it the most appropriate 
entity to administer an opt-in criminal jurisdiction program.195 
To apply, a tribe would have to demonstrate that it is a federal-
ly recognized196 governing body that carries out substantial go-
vernmental duties and powers.197 Second, the application would 
show that the tribal constitution authorizes such jurisdiction,198 
and that the tribe has a procedure for clearly identifying per-
sons who will be subject to the tribe’s jurisdiction.199 Third, 
similar to the determination by the BIA in the re-assumption of 
jurisdiction program under ICWA, the BIA would determine if 
the tribe appears able to exercise jurisdiction over criminal 
matters in a manner consistent with due process and the other 
safeguards embodied in ICRA.200 Finally, the tribe would need 
 
 194. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (prohibiting tribes from imposing “cruel and 
unusual punishment” on criminals). 
 195. In general, the BIA authorizes the creation of—and changes to—tribal 
governments, constitutions, courts, and tribal codes. Id. § 476; see also id. § 2 
(conferring power to Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 
676, 691 (1990). For example, the BIA, in cooperation with the Department of 
Justice, oversees the Tribal Courts Assistance Program, which helps tribal 
governments create and improve tribal judiciaries. Bureau of Justice Assis-
tance, Programs: Tribal Courts Assistance Program (TCAP), http://www.ojp 
.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/tribal.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2009); see also Indian 
Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).  
 196. Federal recognition is necessary to establish tribal identity. COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02[3], at 138–39 (Nell Jessup Newton 
et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
 197. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1) (2000). 
 198. Some tribal constitutions limit the scope of tribal jurisdiction to be 
equivalent to the jurisdiction of the Court of Indian Offenses. See, e.g., MIAMI 
TRIBE OF OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“[T]he judicial authority of the Tribe 
shall be exercised by the Court of Indian Offenses.”); cf. Dussias, supra note 
154, at 242 (noting that changes to some tribal codes and constitutions would 
be necessary for federal recognition of tribal jurisdiction in civil cases involv-
ing Indians and non-Indians). The Courts of Indian Offenses have jurisdiction 
over offenses by Indians committed in Indian country. 25 C.F.R. § 11.102(a) 
(2008). 
 199. Id. at 240 (describing the procedural requirements under ICWA). 
 200. Id. 
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to show that it has made incarceration arrangements for indi-
viduals who receive sentences of greater than one year.201  
If the BIA approves the petition, then a procedure similar 
to that of ICWA should be followed to ensure notification of all 
affected parties. This includes publishing a notice in the Feder-
al Register that clearly defines the territory now governed by 
the tribe, and the sending of a copy of the notice to the tribe, at-
torney general, governor, and highest court of the state or 
states affected by the change in jurisdiction.202 If the BIA does 
not approve the petition, then it would notify the tribe of the 
reasons for its disapproval, offer technical assistance to remedy 
the defects, and allow the tribe to re-petition after correcting 
the defects in the original plan.203 
C.  AN OPT-IN PROGRAM EFFECTUATES THE INTERESTS OF RAPE 
VICTIMS AND TRIBES 
To start, tribal jurisdiction will enhance the probability 
that rape victims see justice, because tribal courts provide a 
more appropriate forum than federal courts for disputes that 
involve Indians or take place in Indian country. The courthouse 
is closer,204 making it easier for victims to present witnesses 
and evidence,205 and the definition and prosecution of the crime 
by members of the community ensures a tailored response that 
is far more likely to meet the unique needs of a Native Ameri-
can rape victim and the community.206 There are other efficien-
cy gains as well: tribal law enforcement and tribal courts would 
operate as a cohesive unit, making it less likely that cases get 
misplaced in the transfer from tribal to federal government.207 
 
 201. Some tribes that lack jails make arrangements to pay state or county 
facilities to accommodate defendants imprisoned by a tribal court. See Andrea 
Smith, How the Criminal Justice System Uses Domestic Violence Programs 
Against Native Women, WOMEN AND PRISON: A SITE FOR RESISTANCE, n.d.,  
http://womenandprison.org/social-justice/andrea-smith.html. The Department 
of Justice also makes grants available to tribes to plan and construct correc-
tional facilities. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Programs: Correctional Facili-
ties on Tribal Lands Program, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/tribal_ 
correction.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2009). 
 202. Dussias, supra note 154, at 240 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 13.14(a)(3), (b) 
(1986)). 
 203. Id. at 240–41 (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 13.14(c), (d), 13.16 (1986)). 
 204. Id. at 233. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Radon, supra note 25, at 1302. 
 207. Id. (“The criminal justice system cannot function when its two main 
components—police and prosecutors—work in isolation.”).  
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Furthermore, such an approach does not force Native American 
women to choose between supporting tribal sovereignty and 
seeking prosecution,208 and is likely to have broad support 
within the Native American community.209  
In particular, an opt-in program would be ideal because 
tribes differ in their ability and willingness to assume broader 
jurisdiction.210 The current system often does not provide Na-
tive American rape victims with justice and may encourage 
self-help remedies from the community.211 Thus, where the tri-
bal government is willing and able to assume jurisdiction and 
seek justice on the victim’s behalf, the tribe should do so. Be-
fore Oliphant, many tribes extended criminal jurisdiction to 
non-Indians, and it is likely that they will wish to do so again if 
given the opportunity.212  
On the contrary, jurisdiction should not be transferred to 
tribal governments that cannot or will not meet certain mini-
mum requirements. Tribes that are unwilling to exercise juris-
diction would probably not bother with the lengthy application 
process, and an opt-in program would carefully screen tribes for 
the ability to carry out significant law-enforcement responsibil-
ities. Yet an opt-in program leaves the opportunity available to 
tribes that cannot currently afford to develop a judiciary but 
may be able to in the future.213 
Lastly, allowing tribal jurisdiction would benefit both the 
federal government and tribal governments. Tribal govern-
ments would benefit from improved tribal courts, because broa-
dened jurisdiction is “integral to the internal legitimacy of tri-
bal legal systems and the extent to which tribal communities 
accept them as valid institutions,”214 and benefits victims of all 
crimes committed by non-Indians on the reservation by estab-
lishing an alternate forum for prosecution.215 Also, some argue 
that transferring jurisdiction over important matters preserves 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. For example, the National Congress of American Indians supports in-
creases in tribal sentencing authority, prosecutorial authority, and federal 
support to enhance tribes’ response to violence against Native American wom-
en. Norrell, supra note 16. 
 210. Dussias, supra note 154, at 237. 
 211. Cunningham, supra note 191, at 2201. 
 212. Radon, supra note 25, at 1292. 
 213. See id. at 1311. 
 214. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Non-
members in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1109–14 (2005). 
 215. See Radon, supra note 25, at 1303. 
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institutional incentives for tribal judges to do their jobs well,216 
and that increased tribal jurisdiction is likely to enhance the 
day-to-day functioning of the tribal judicial system.217 Further, 
self-determination has had, and under an opt-in program will 
most likely continue to have, the effect of improving the ac-
countability of tribal officials to members.218 Further, assump-
tion of jurisdiction over cases and responsibility for prosecution 
by tribes would likely reduce reliance on federal and state re-
sources. Finally, allowing some tribes to prosecute major crimes 
frees federal prosecutors and courts to proceed more efficiently 
with the types of cases with which they are most competent.219  
D.  OBSTACLES TO CREATING AN OPT-IN PROGRAM FOR 
ASSUMING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
For this Note, the primary concern with regard to an opt-in 
program for criminal jurisdiction is whether such a solution 
would meet the needs of Native American rape victims. Some 
critics might voice concern that tribes would use Tribal Peace-
making (TPM) inappropriately.220 As discussed above, however, 
tribes generally do not use TPM where the defendant is not a 
member, and the vast majority of reported perpetrators are 
non-Indians. Additionally, a victim’s advocate might argue that 
a tribal court might lack the resources or the willpower to train 
judges, prosecutors, police, and staff to deal with emotionally 
fragile sexual assault victims. The proposed opt-in program ac-
counts for such a possibility by requiring the BIA to set stan-
dards and provide funding as part of its role in determining 
which tribal courts it will allow to assume criminal jurisdiction. 
The general public’s main concerns would likely relate to 
whether defendants would receive due process in tribal courts 
and whether tribal courts would be likely to exercise jurisdic-
tion so as not to create a public safety hazard off the reserva-
 
 216. Berger, supra note 214, at 1052, 1115–18 (“[I]nstitutional pride leads 
the judges to carefully scrutinize the facts, law, and morality of the issues be-
fore them to fulfill this institutional role and resist temptations to rule based 
on the status of the parties or political pressure.”). 
 217. See id. at 1119–20 (arguing that tribal courts with broader judicial ex-
perience function better than tribal courts that deal with more limited issues). 
 218. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 832 (citation 
omitted). 
 219. Washburn, American Indians, supra note 33, at 729–30 (arguing that 
the physical and cultural distances between tribal communities and federal 
prosecutors undermine the institutional competence of the latter). 
 220. Bradford, supra note 116, at 584–85. 
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tion. Due process concerns probably depend more on the pub-
lic’s perception of unfairness (despite the sophistication of 
many tribal courts) than on any proof that tribal courts are 
likely to be unfair to non-Indian defendants.221 ICRA closely re-
sembles the Bill of Rights, with the exception of the right to 
free legal counsel,222 and some courts even provide greater pro-
tections than the Bill of Rights.223 Some tribes require jurors to 
be tribal members—but other tribes, like the Navajo, select ju-
rors from a jury pool that reflects a cross-section of the commu-
nity.224 Some tribes do implement modes of dispute resolution 
and tribal laws that differ from state and federal laws,225 but 
most tribal courts chose to base their codes and judicial sys-
tems on the BIA code and courts,226 and the supremacy of state 
and federal laws in district courts has resulted in much conflu-
ence between the federal and tribal legal systems.227 Ultimate-
ly, both the theory and the practice of Indian dispute resolution 
and the TPM concept indicate that it cannot successfully be ap-
plied to defendants who are not members of the community, 
and thus is not applied to them.228 Therefore, allowing a tribe 
to prosecute a non-resident (whether non-Indian or a non-
member Indian) should not differ from allowing a state to pros-
ecute a citizen of another state for violations of its own laws.229 
Indeed, as one scholar points out, the chances of a rogue tribal 
 
 221. Cunningham, supra note 191, at 2200. One scholar surveyed ten cases 
involving ICRA interpretation and found “no indication that tribal courts have 
succumbed to the temptation to favor the insider at the expense of outsiders.” 
Mark Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Fed-
eral Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 479, 578 (2000). 
 222. Radon, supra note 25, at 1306–08. Congress has already shown its wil-
lingness to provide additional funding to tribal courts. Indian Tribal Justice 
Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 
2778 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). Tribes that qualified for an 
opt-in program could automatically receive additional funding for defense 
counsel on an as-needed basis. Indeed, tribes that have benefited from tourism 
and gambling may not need federal assistance at all.  
 223. For example, at least one tribe grants a jury trial for all crimes, re-
gardless of severity. Radon, supra note 25, at 1308. 
 224. Burleson, supra note 66, at 215–16. 
 225. For instance, traditional Native legal systems emphasize restoration 
of the offender and his (or her) reintegration into the community. Bradford, 
supra note 116, at 565. 
 226. Dussias, supra note 154, at 225–26. 
 227. Bradford, supra note 116, at 575. 
 228. See id. at 578–79. 
 229. See Cunningham, supra note 191, at 2200–01. 
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court making decisions in bad faith are similar to the chances 
of rogue state courts doing the same.230  
An independent judiciary and the availability of appellate 
review would further allay many concerns about rogue tribal 
courts. Independent judicial review is important to the protec-
tion of individual rights,231 but “the ability of tribal councils to 
remove judges limits the independence of tribal courts.”232 The 
BIA could play a key role in determining whether a tribe’s past 
functioning indicates that it has independently functioning 
courts. Appellate review, vested in either a federal court or a 
specialized tribal appellate court, would further protect indi-
viduals’ freedom against arbitrary or abusive actions by tribal 
governments.233 Although federal appellate review could in-
trude on tribal sovereignty by imposing federal laws on tribal 
decisions or by creating the perception that tribal courts are 
“inferior,”234 tribal appellate review in tribal courts—with no 
recourse to the federal judicial system—may feed the paranoia. 
In contrast, appellate review in the federal courts would not re-
quire the creation or funding of any additional courts and 
would alleviate concerns in the non-Indian community of dis-
crimination against outsiders. 
Lack of political support to create such a program is also a 
valid concern. The Supreme Court has affirmed that tribes 
have inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians—but Oliphant 
and Lara both make it clear that for tribes to exercise such ju-
risdiction, Congress must reinvest tribal jurisdiction,235 as it 
has done through programs such as the “Re-assumption of Ju-
risdiction” for the adoption of Indian children and “Treatment 
 
 230. See Berger, supra note 214, at 1096–97. 
 231. See Burleson, supra note 66, at 215.  
 232. Id. (citing O’Connor, supra note 113, at 5). 
 233. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 
(1949) (“[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to al-
low . . . officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legisla-
tion and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon 
them if larger numbers were affected.”). 
 234. Radon, supra note 25, at 1309. 
 235. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution 
authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal 
authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.”); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 
698 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) 
(holding that ICRA and the prevalence of crime on reservations are “consider-
ations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes should finally 
be authorized to try non-Indians”). 
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as State” under federal environmental laws.236 Congress has 
recognized both the need to protect Native American women 
from sexual assault237 and the need for strong tribal govern-
ments to counteract the high levels of crime in Indian coun-
try.238 For example, a recent Senate bill proposed that the Ho-
meland Security Act be amended to recognize the inherent 
sovereignty of tribes with regard to law enforcement and crimi-
nal matters.239 Although this specific bill has not yet passed, 
recent legislative history with regard to criminal justice and 
sexual assault suggest that Congress would support an opt-in 
solution.240 
On the whole, the greatest obstacle to tribal jurisdiction 
may not lie in the structure of tribal governments or their ad-
herence to Anglo-American ideals, but simply in the lack of 
consistent funding and clear direction from Congress. The U.S. 
Civil Rights Commission conducted a study on tribal imple-
mentation of ICRA and found that “while there [are] problems 
in tribal courts, they [are] primarily due to insufficient funds 
and the problems of any new court system in establishing its 
role and the scope of its authority.”241 As with other obstacles 
discussed in this section, Congress can remedy the lack of fund-
 
 236. See Rodgers, supra note 152, at 818–19; Pauline Turner Strong, What 
Is an Indian Family? The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Renascence of Tri-
bal Sovereignty, 46 AM. STUD. 205, 224 (2005). 
 237. See, e.g., STOP Violence, supra note 193. 
 238. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 
2000 §§ 2–3, Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 2778, 2778–79 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 3651–53, 3661–66 & 3681) (providing funding for tribal governments 
to strengthen tribal justice systems); Cawley, supra note 14, at 434–35.  
 239. Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, S. 578, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 240. See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. 
(2008) (requiring federal authorities to file declination reports when they 
refuse a prosecution and allowing tribes the option to increase maximum sen-
tences to three years as long as counsel is provided to defendants); 154 CONG. 
REC. S7158 (daily ed. July 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (“One of the 
primary causes for violent crime is the disjointed system of justice in Indian 
country that is broken at its core. The current system limits the authority of 
Tribes to fight crime, and requires tribal communities to rely completely on 
the United States to investigate and prosecute violent crimes occurring on res-
ervations.”); S. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., CONCEPT PAPER FOR 
AN INDIAN COUNTRY CRIME BILL 15, available at http://www.indian.senate 
.gov/public/_files/IndianCrimeBillCONCEPTPAPER.pdf (recommending a pi-
lot project acknowledging the inherent authority of tribes over any person who 
commits sexual assault on a reservation). 
 241. Berger, supra note 214, at 1096 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 29–57 (1991)). 
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ing through its exercise of plenary power to establish an opt-in 
program.  
III.  LAW AND POLICY BOTH INDICATE THAT TRIBES 
SHOULD HAVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION   
A strong legal and policy basis exists for overturning Oli-
phant. First, the evidence supporting the finding of implicit di-
vestment in Oliphant, on which Duro relied for its reasoning, is 
not particularly strong.242 In both Oliphant and Duro, the Su-
preme Court held that tribal criminal jurisdiction had been im-
pliedly divested by tribes’ dependent status,243 and if exercised, 
such jurisdiction would constitute an “unwarranted intrusion[] 
on [defendants’] personal liberty.”244 
In analyzing the Choctaw Treaty in Oliphant, the Court 
disregarded a central principle of Indian law: that courts 
should construe treaties as the tribes would have understood 
them.245 In interpreting text from the treaty that stated that 
“the tribe is guaranteed jurisdiction and government of all the 
persons and property that may be within their limits,”246 the 
Choctaw could reasonably have understood this provision to 
mean that they would have jurisdiction over any persons who 
entered their territory, Indian or otherwise.247 Similarly, the 
Court relied on a lone 1878 district court opinion, which has 
garnered little clear support from the federal government.248  
The Court may also have misinterpreted evidence of con-
gressional intent. For example, it construed the General 
Crimes Act as evidence of Congress’s intent to remove jurisdic-
 
 242. Radon, supra note 25, at 1290–93. 
 243. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 207–08 (1978). 
 244. Duro, 495 U.S. at 692 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210). 
 245. Peter C. Monson, Casenote, United States v. Washington (Phase II): 
The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENVTL. L. 469, 476 n.38 
(1982) (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Ves-
sel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 
196, § 2.02 (describing the canons of construction of federal Indian law). 
 246. Radon, supra note 25, at 1291 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 247. See id. (“If Congress wanted to ensure that tribes would not have the 
power to try non-Indians, it ‘could have expressed that intent more clearly 
than it did in the 1830 treaty.’”) (quoting Peter Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suqua-
mish Indian Tribe: The Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 391, 412 (1993)). 
 248. See id. 
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tion from tribes;249 however, history indicates that the govern-
ment’s only intent was to assure that a forum existed to protect 
Indians from “the lawless part of our frontier inhabitants”250 in 
the absence of tribal courts, which is no longer the case. Like-
wise, the Court read the 1834 Western Territory bill251 as Con-
gress’s careful attempt to avoid giving criminal jurisdiction to 
tribes,252 but observed only in a footnote that the bill did not 
pass because it lacked support.253 Ultimately, the Court’s deci-
sion rested on nothing more than implication. Courts generally 
avoid extending Congress’s plenary power over tribes by impli-
cation unless the matter relates closely to a federal statute.254 
Where the evidence was ambiguous, as here, the Supreme 
Court should have followed the presumption against implied 
divestment laid out by precedent. 
Furthermore, the Oliphant holding should not apply to all 
tribes. For example, at least one treaty explicitly provided that 
a United States citizen settling on Indian land “shall forfeit the 
protection of the United States, and the Cherokees may punish 
him or not, as they please.”255 Further support comes from an 
1834 House Report, which explicitly notes that “we cannot, con-
sistently with the provisions of some [of] our treaties, and of 
the territorial act, extend our criminal laws to offences commit-
ted by or against Indians, of which the tribes have exclusive ju-
risdiction.”256 Each tribe negotiated its own treaty with the 
United States, and many were never expressly abrogated; the 
federal government simply stopped enforcing them.257 Indeed, 
the treaties that provided for criminal jurisdiction were most 
similar to the type of treaty providing extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion—the exercise of jurisdiction outside a sovereign’s territo-
ry.258 Courts have recognized the transfer of power described in 
 
 249. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201 (interpreting the General Crimes Act). 
 250. See, e.g., George Washington, Seventh Annual Address, 1 A COMPILA-
TION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1908, 182, 185 
(James D. Richardson ed., 1909). 
 251. H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 36 (1834). 
 252. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202. 
 253. Id. at 202 n.13 (noting Congress’s failure to pass the bill even after 
several revisions and resubmissions). 
 254. Crawford, supra note 185, at 414. For example, the Major Crimes Act 
includes lesser-included offenses. Id. 
 255. Treaty at Holston art. VIII, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39, 40. 
 256. H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 13 (1834). 
 257. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 794.  
 258. See Crawford, supra note 185, at 416–17. 
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such treaties as a grant of power from the independent sove-
reign to the United States,259 not an implicit divestment of the 
foreign country’s inherent authority. Thus, the lack of a treaty 
provision granting exclusive jurisdiction to the United States 
may mean that some tribes still retain such inherent jurisdic-
tion, regardless of specific treaty provisions, because those trea-
ties did not explicitly transfer power from tribes to the United 
States.260  
Oliphant and Duro both rested on the same “personal li-
berty” and “implicit divestment” arguments.261 Since Congress 
rejected the jurisdictional distinction between member and 
nonmember Indians in Duro,262 and nothing other than race263 
distinguishes nonmember Indians from non-Indians from the 
perspective of a tribal court,264 it logically follows that the Su-
preme Court should eliminate the distinction between Indians 
and non-Indians. Indeed, factors such as government participa-
tion, membership, or citizenship are usually considered only 
with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction while tribal govern-
ments here seek only to extend only their territorial jurisdic-
tion.265 
 
 259. See id. The reasoning behind these treaties was that courts in some 
non-Christian (mostly Muslim and Far Eastern) countries were so inferior 
that U.S. citizens could not possibly obtain justice there due to bias, religious 
or otherwise. See id. 
 260. Id. at 408 n.54 (“Since treaties represent grants of power from tribes, 
failure of tribes to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government 
meant that tribes retained the jurisdiction.”). 
 261. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686, 692–93 (1990); Oliphant v. Suqua-
mish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208, 210 (1978). 
 262. Duro, 495 U.S. at 695–96 (arguing that nonmembers bear more re-
semblance to non-Indians with regard to their status on the reservation). 
 263.  Native Americans may constitute either a political group, Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (“The [employment] preference, as applied, 
is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of 
quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the 
BIA in a unique fashion.”) or a racial group, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 
(2000) (distinguishing Morton v. Mancari and striking down Hawaii’s re-
quirement that voters for trustees of indigenous trusts be descended from 
those who inhabited the Islands prior to 1778 as race based and thus unconsti-
tutional). From the perspective of a tribal court, however, neither a non-Indian 
nor a nonmember Indian belongs to the tribe. 
 264. Gould, supra note 98, at 70 n.77 (citation omitted). But see Means v. 
Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 931–35 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that 
“Means’s equal protection argument has real force” but concluding that the 
1990 amendments to ICRA define nonmember Indians on the basis of political 
affiliation, not race). 
 265. Crawford, supra note 185, at 432. 
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Finally, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by federal and 
state governments in Indian country does not rest on any con-
stitutional authority.266 The Indian Commerce Clause is insuf-
ficient to justify the plenary power on which the Oliphant 
Court rests its finding that tribes are “domestic dependent na-
tions.”267 Even if Congress has the power to regulate commerce 
with tribes, its authority should not extend to the power to re-
gulate the tribes themselves.268 Further, weakness and hel-
plessness are insufficient to justify plenary power over na-
tions—just as the federal government does not have plenary 
power over Ethiopia, however frail and dependent it might 
be.269 This is especially true in the era of self-determination, 
when even the Oliphant Court of 1978 recognized that many 
tribes are neither weak nor helpless270 nor in need of “fixed 
laws [and] . . . competent tribunals of justice.”271  
The Supreme Court has, under certain circumstances, rec-
ognized tribal courts as the appropriate forums for the exclu-
sive adjudication of disputes that affect the important personal 
or property interests of either an Indian or a non-Indian.272 
Sexual assault clearly affects “an important personal interest” 
of the rape victim. Even in Oliphant, dissenting Justice Mar-
shall and Chief Justice Burger argued that “[I]n the absence of 
affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute . . . Indian tribes 
enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the 
 
 266. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (arguing that “it 
would be a very strained construction of [the Indian Commerce] clause” to 
enact laws to punish common-law crimes without any reference to trade and 
intercourse). 
 267. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214–15 (2004) (Thomas, J. 
concurring) (asserting that the Constitution does not grant Congress plenary 
power to define tribal sovereignty). See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Against 
Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069 (2004) (discrediting suggested 
bases for Congress’s plenary power over tribes, including the Treaty Clause, 
the Property Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause).  
 268. Prakash, supra note 267, at 1081. 
 269. Id. at 1103–04. 
 270. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212–13 (1978) 
(“[S]ome Indian tribal court systems have become increasingly sophisticated 
and resemble in many respects their state counterparts.”). 
 271. Id. at 210. 
 272. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (“Tribal courts 
have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adju-
dication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of 
both Indians and non-Indians.”). 
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right to try and punish all persons who commit offenses against 
tribal law within the reservation.”273  
Furthermore, as a matter of policy, the current system 
does not meet the needs of Native American rape victims or the 
victims of any other violent crimes committed on reservations. 
The determination of whether the accused is an “Indian,” of 
whether a piece of land falls within the definition of “Indian 
land,” and ultimately, whether tribal, state, or federal law en-
forcement should prosecute the sexual assault can result in 
considerable dispute in practice, thwarting a Native American 
woman’s access to justice.274 Similarly, the difficulty of deter-
mining whether federal, state, or tribal laws apply275 compli-
cates the tribe’s ability to arrest and prosecute where the rele-
vant federal or state prosecutor chooses not to do so. The 
resulting confusion contributes to the lack of prosecution of 
rapes committed against Native American women.276 The cur-
rent administration of criminal justice in Indian country is also 
inconsistent with self-determination policy277 and the extent to 
which tribes can exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Both law and policy suggest that Congress should allow tribes 
to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed against Native 
Americans and on the reservation.  
 
 273. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)) (agreeing 
with the lower court that the “power to preserve order on the reservation . . . is 
a sine qua non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed”). 
 274. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 27–28; Thorington, supra note 49, at 
977 (listing factors to consider in the determination of a tribe’s jurisdiction: 
“whether the parties are Indian or non-Indian, tribal members or nonmember 
Indians; whether the incident occurred in Indian country . . . whether the 
crime is a ‘major crime’; and whether the tribe is subject to federal legislation 
limiting the tribes’ jurisdiction”). 
 275. Although many tribes have laws and ordinances that govern the pu-
nishment of sexual violence, federal courts prosecuting a crime by or against 
an Indian according to the General Crimes Act still apply the law “in the same 
manner as . . . within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3242 (2006). Even on Indian land, if a non-Indian commits a crime 
or is the victim of a crime, federal law applies except where jurisdiction has 
been ceded to the state. Blumenthal, supra note 29.  
 276. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 8. 
 277.  For an overview of federal Indian policy in the last fifty years, popu-
larly known as “self-determination,” see COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 196, 
§ 1.07. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Even a glance at the legal system in Indian country reveals 
a certain irony. Tribes can protect their members from the 
long-term effects of water pollution but cannot provide any pro-
tection against direct, imminent threats such as sexual assault. 
Although the Supreme Court finds it unfair to subject Indians 
to federal criminal jurisdiction278 and non-Indians to tribal 
criminal jurisdiction,279 the Major Crimes Act ensures that fed-
eral courts retain jurisdiction over Indians but not vice versa.280 
But irony provides little comfort to a Native American woman 
who has suffered sexual assault and all of its collateral conse-
quences. If the offender is Native American, then she must bal-
ance her own desire for reparation or punishment against those 
of her tribal community. If the offender is non-Indian, then her 
perpetrator is likely to go unpunished, and nothing stops him 
from committing the same offense again. 
The statutes and cases that form the basis of modern crim-
inal jurisdiction are inconsistent and do not reflect modern fed-
eral Indian policy. Tribal governments have demonstrated the 
capacity and desire to undertake certain types of civil regulato-
ry authority,281 and many systems include features similar to 
the Anglo-American system.282 Providing tribes with the option 
to opt in to criminal jurisdiction would reduce jurisdictional 
confusion, provide more culturally relevant justice, respect tri-
bal sovereignty, and help tribal governments achieve the goal 
of self-determination set by Congress and the executive branch. 
Ultimately, tribes could experiment according to the prefe-
rences and needs of their members in the same way that states 
serve as laboratories for the development of laws.283 Although 
 
 278.  Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (arguing that it would be 
unfair to subject Indians to alien federal courts because such courts try In-
dians “according to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect 
conception”). 
 279. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (ar-
guing that non-Indian citizens should be “protected by the United States from 
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty” by tribal courts). 
 280. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 169, at 147–48. 
 281. For example, tribes have successfully implemented Treatment-as-
State provisions of the Clean Water Act, Rodgers, supra note 152, at 818–19, 
and reassumption of jurisdiction provisions of ICWA. See Strong, supra note 
236, at 224.  
 282. Dussias, supra note 154, at 233–34 (noting that tribal laws generally 
are not substantially different from Anglo-American laws, and procedures are 
generally conducted in English).  
 283. O’Connor, supra note 113, at 5–6. 
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Oliphant and Duro articulate important constitutional concerns 
about fairness to non-Indians, readily achievable procedural 
adjustments would allow individual tribal governments to meet 
due process requirements and receive congressional approval to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians 
alike. An opt-in program that transfers criminal jurisdiction to 
tribes that are ready and willing addresses the concerns ex-
pressed by the Court and brings justice to victims of rape.  
